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CHAPTER 12
Presidents, Institutions, and the 
Quest for Coherent Leadership
TAPIO RAUNIO
Takeaways for Leading Change
Comparing three semi-presidential regimes, the main argument of this 
chapter is that institutional design has a strong independent effect on 
leadership. Drawing on official documents and interview data with top-level 
civil servants and politicians, it underlines the importance of coordination 
mechanisms between the president and the prime minister. Such 
institutional arrangements facilitate effective policy-making and mitigate 
tensions between the two executives. Reflecting its more stable and regulated 
political system, Finland stands out with its strongly institutionalised 
coordination mechanisms and low level of intra-executive conflict. In 
Lithuania and Romania, on the other hand, each new president brings her 
own staff, personality and leadership style to the equation, with Romanian 
politics in particular characterised by high levels of tension between the 
president and the prime minister. The Lithuanian and Romanian cases 
indicate that absent of written rules or otherwise strong norms guiding 
intra-executive coordination, presidents enjoy more discretion in designing 
their own modes of operation. Under such circumstances presidents are 
more likely to use alternative channels of influence, such as public criticism 
of the cabinet or direct contacts with political parties, the legislature, or 
civil society stakeholders, and to intervene in questions falling under the 
competence of the government. This undermines coherent leadership and 
can even have serious consequences for regime stability, not least in the 
personality-centred politics commonly found in Central and East European 
countries and other more fragile democracies.
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Semi-presidentialism denotes a political system where a directly-elected president shares executive power with a prime minister (PM). 
Importantly, semi-presidentialism, which is the most common regime 
type in Europe, seems more prone to conflicts than parliamentarism or 
presidentialism. To be more specific, it is unique in the sense that conflicts 
can arise within the executive branch, between the president and the PM 
and the government. Such conflicts can be particularly damaging in terms 
of coherent leadership and policy-making. Largely influenced by Shugart 
and Carey (1992), studies have established that conflict between the two 
executives is to be expected under two types of 
semi-presidentialism – in premier-presidential 
regimes (where the cabinet can only be 
dismissed by the parliament) and president-
parliamentary regimes (where both the 
president and the parliament have the formal 
power to dismiss the cabinet). Intra-executive 
conflict is associated with negative outcomes 
such as cabinet instability (Sedelius & Ekman, 
2010) and disruptive policy-making (Lazardeux, 
2015). Research has furthermore established 
that conflict is more likely under cohabitation, 
defined as a situation where the president and 
the PM represent different political parties 
or ideological blocs (Protsyk, 2005; 2006; 
Sedelius & Mashtaler, 2013; Elgie, 2018).
A largely neglected variable in the comparative literature on intra-
executive conflict, however, is the institutional instruments for coordinating 
policy and executive leadership between the president and the cabinet. 
In fact, we know very little about the extent to which coordination 
mechanisms between the two executives vary among semi-presidential 
countries, and more importantly, how such variation may influence the 
balance of power between the two chief executives. This chapter argues that 
coordination mechanisms between the president and the prime minister 
are of crucial importance in explaining presidential activism and intra-
executive conflict. To be clear, it is not expected that such coordination 
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mechanisms are necessarily more important than key institutional variables 
such as presidential powers, cohabitation, or electoral and party system 
dynamics. But this chapter argues that typical intra-executive conflicts 
over policy, legislation and appointments may in fact be manifestations of 
coordination problems. Successful leadership in semi-presidential regimes 
requires regular dialogue between the president and the PM, particularly 
in policy areas where they share power. Apart from facilitating beneficial 
outcomes, effective coordination mechanisms reduce uncertainty so that 
the individuals are aware of and can anticipate each other’s preferences 
and behaviour. In line with institutional theory, institutions can thus make 
a difference in that they induce actors otherwise driven by self-interest 
towards a “problem-solving” mode characterised by cooperation and search 
for mutually beneficial solutions (e.g., Scharpf, 1989; North, 1990). And in 
line with the “logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 1989; 2006), stable 
and repeated coordination should also over time strengthen the socialisation 
effects of institutions whereby both executives, their offices, and other 
stakeholders become accustomed to certain “ways of doing things” and 
perceive regular coordination as the appropriate course of action.
Examining semi-presidentialism and intra-executive coordination is 
thus ultimately research about leadership. Students of political leadership 
normally emphasise that the leaders of political regimes should provide 
clear and sufficiently dynamic leadership, especially during more turbulent 
times. Communication plays an important role in modern leadership, with 
leaders expected to justify their positions and inform the electorate through 
a variety of channels (Helms, 2012; Rhodes & ‘t Hart, 2014; Elgie, 2018). 
Hence the chapter contributes to this edited volume through examining 
political leadership as exercised by presidents in three European countries. 
The comparative dimension enables us to draw lessons about both the 
causes and consequences of presidential behaviour and which institutional 
mechanisms facilitate stable leadership.
The selected cases are three premier-presidential countries: Finland, 
Lithuania and Romania. While the three countries have rather similar 
constitutional designs, they at the same time represent variation regarding 
presidential powers, level of intra-executive conflict, and political context. 
Finland is a long established democracy with a highly institutionalised 
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political system, where a recent constitutional reform resulted in a 
significant weakening of its historically strong presidency. Lithuania, on the 
contrary, is a young democracy with a largely personalised political culture 
but has generally functioned with few instances of severe intra-executive 
conflict. Romania, finally, has faced more severe transitional difficulties 
and has struggled with disruptive policy-making, widespread corruption 
and several instances of intense conflict between the president and the 
government. The constitutional powers of the president are somewhat 
stronger in Lithuania and Romania than in Finland.
Asking “do institutions matter”, this study will dig deeper into institutional 
design at the level of practices, routines and coordination instruments between 
the executives, that is, at a level where comparative research is currently 
lacking on systematic and empirical knowledge. By utilising interview data 
with key civil servants and politicians, and official documents, it is able 
to reach “behind the scenes” to explore the importance of coordination 
mechanisms and how they are associated with presidential activism and 
intra-executive conflict. The next part sets the theoretical framework by 
addressing the incentives and disincentives for conflict and cooperation 
between the president and the PM and by identifying coordination 
instruments relevant to the interaction between the two executives. The 
subsequent section presents case selection and data. The empirical analysis 
is structured around the presence or absence of coordination mechanisms 
identified in the theoretical section. The concluding discussion summarises 
and discusses briefly the implications of the findings.
Theoretical Framework: (Dis)incentives for 
Cooperation and Coordination Mechanisms
Semi-presidential regimes encompass vast differences on the precise 
relationship between the cabinet and the president, also within the category 
of premier-presidential countries. There are countries where the president 
is merely a ceremonial head of state and the PM controls the policy-making 
process. Finland’s 2000 constitution, for example, provides the president 
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with formal prerogatives, particularly through co-leadership of foreign 
policy, that are just above those of a ceremonial figurehead. A potential 
risk with this model, however, is that a weak and marginalised, yet directly-
elected, president can seek to compensate his or her limited powers with 
obtrusive behaviour, especially if the president’s popularity outweighs 
his or her formal powers. The literature on semi-presidentialism is full of 
examples of such behaviour. When the government is clearly dominant, also 
the PM can feel no need for coordination beyond perhaps the president’s 
office receiving information about governmental decisions and policies. 
In general, the president and the PM should thus have stronger incentives 
to seek cooperation where there is a more balanced distribution of power 
between the government and the president and if the two executives 
share powers in particular policy areas. Under such power-sharing there 
are simply more issues subject to joint decision-making and thus also to 
intra-executive coordination. To be sure, there are also more possibilities 
for disagreement and conflict, which raise the need for regular and well-
defined coordination in order to facilitate successful policy-making. The 
latter applies especially to foreign and security policies, including European 
Union (EU) affairs, issue areas where it is often emphasised that disunity 
at home should not undermine success abroad. 
Regardless of the exact powers of presidents, presidential activism tends 
to be higher when the country is experiencing political turbulence, with low 
level of societal consensus or weak governments (e.g., Tavits, 2009). These 
considerations are particularly relevant for the younger democracies such 
as in Central and Eastern Europe, where surveys show high levels of public 
trust in the presidents but outright distrust in other political actors such as 
the PM and the parties. The presidents’ greater popularity may be attributed 
to their limited powers. They have projected themselves to be above party 
politics, being somewhat elevated from the usual political quarrels. Prime 
ministers, on the contrary, experience the dilemma of exercising their 
power in areas of controversy, such as social and economic policies, thereby 
further eroding their popular support. Hence, presidents are normally 
constitutionally assigned to stand above party politics. The paradox, 
however, is that presidents may feel that their popularity does not translate 
into political influence. When seeking ways of converting their perceived 
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prestige into actual power, they can publicly criticise the government by 
leaning on the popular mandate. Weak presidents thus seek to compensate 
their limited constitutional powers with more indirect channels of influence 
or obtrusive behaviour. And, as stated in the introductory section, tensions 
between the two executives are more likely under cohabitation.
Having discussed briefly the (dis)incentives for coordination between 
the president and the PM and the contextual factors influencing intra-
executive cooperation, Figure 1 summarises the basic theoretical argument. 
It understands cooperation mechanisms as intervening variables positioned 
between key explanatory factors derived from previous literature on semi-
presidentialism (the distribution of power between the president and 
the cabinet, the role of party politics, and the societal context) and the 
outcome – which is the level of presidential activism that influences intra-
executive conflict and thereby also leadership capacity or performance. 
The more regular and institutionalised the coordination mechanisms are, 
the stronger their effect should be. 
It is argued here that coordination mechanisms can make a genuine 
difference: individual office-holders are constrained by them, especially 
when the mechanisms have become more entrenched and recognised 
as legitimate by the actors involved. In contrast, when coordination 
instruments do not exist or are weak, then both executives have more 
freedom of manoeuvre. Absent of a working constitutional division of labor 
and regular coordination, particularly the presidents are more likely to use 
alternative channels of influence – such as the strategy of “going public” 
or direct contacts with political parties, the legislature, or civil society 







e.g. distribution of 
power, party politics, 
parliamentary majority, 
societal context
FIGURE 1. Coordination mechanisms and intra-executive conflict
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stakeholders – and to intervene in questions falling under the competence 
of the government. Furthermore, ad hoc practices are likely to favour the 
side that, either because of constitutional division of power or through 
contextual factors, enjoys agenda-setting powers and can thus choose or 
at least strongly influence the levels and forms of coordination. 
But how to define coordination mechanisms? Three levels of coordination 
are identified – bilateral (between the president the PM), collective 
(between the president and the government), and administrative (between 
the offices of the president and the prime minister and the ministries) 
– whilst also differentiating among policy areas. The coordination 
instruments are introduced one-by-one, identifying also their predicted 
roles in intra-executive coordination (Figure 2).
Bilateral meetings between the president and prime minister. Particular 
importance is assigned to confidential exchanges between the two leaders 










FIGURE 2. Coordination mechanisms between the president and the cabinet
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coordination mechanisms is placed at the centre of the pyramid in Figure 2. 
Regular talks between the president and the PM enable them to learn about 
each other’s preferences, negotiation styles, and personalities. Such face-
to-face contacts should ideally take place before the president meets the 
whole government or before either side meets foreign leaders or attends 
international or EU meetings. In this way, potentially sensitive issues can be 
discussed in private and even if no compromise is found, both leaders can 
agree on how to proceed with these matters. However, it is unlikely that laws 
would regulate such bilateral meetings. Hence, they can also be particularly 
vulnerable to break down after the election of new office-holders.
Ministerial committees or joint councils between the president and the 
government. As the literature on coalition governments shows, ministerial 
committees perform an important function in both cabinet decision-
making and as a conflict-resolution mechanism (Müller & Strøm, 2000; 
Strøm, Müller, & Bergman, 2008). These ministerial committees usually 
bring together a sub-set of ministers from all coalition parties and they 
deal with specific issue areas such as economic policy or European policy. 
The powers and composition of the ministerial committees are typically 
regulated by laws or even by constitutions, with more detailed rules found 
in the government’s rules of procedure. In policy areas where the president 
shares power with the government, mainly in foreign and security policy, 
such ministerial committees would enable both sides to keep track of 
developments and to exchange ideas before the formal decision-making 
stage. Various joint councils would on average have a more informal status 
and bring together the president and ministers to discuss specific societal 
issues such as education or economy. They could also take the form of 
periodic meetings between the whole government and the president that 
would focus perhaps mainly on topical issues. 
National security, foreign policy, or EU affairs councils. External relations 
were identified as a policy area where directly-elected presidents not only 
have constitutional powers but where countries are expected to act with one 
voice. This applies particularly to security and defense policies, issue areas 
that are highly salient and where domestic consensus is appreciated (e.g. 
Raunio & Wagner, 2017). National security councils or equivalents often have 
a central role in defining and planning the countries’ security and military 
231
Leading Change in a Complex World: Transdisciplinary Perspectives
Presidents, Institutions, and the Quest for Coherent Leadership
strategies. They can simultaneously facilitate intra-executive coordination, 
but who chairs such bodies can be a delicate question. Naturally, ministerial 
committees can also be established to examine foreign and security policy 
and indeed European matters. EU affairs pose particular challenges for 
coordination, especially as the development of the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) means that national foreign and security policies 
– areas where presidents enjoy constitutional powers – are increasingly 
linked to European level policy processes (Raunio, 2012). Hence, whether 
the president is involved in or excluded from the national EU coordination 
system can have broader implications for leadership in foreign affairs. 
Coordination between civil servants of the offices of the prime minister and 
the president. Moving to the administrative level, the interaction between 
the respective offices of the president and the PM can play an important 
role, especially regarding information exchange. Comparative literature 
suggests that the role of top-level administrative elites has become more 
important over the decades. Political leaders have typically two categories 
of staff working for them: civil servants that work for the state and political 
staff that come and go with individual office-holders. The staff at the prime 
minister’s office oversees and coordinates activities in the ministries and 
perhaps also public sector agencies while handling central governmental 
communication. Particularly the political staff provides policy advice to the 
PM or the president, including in foreign and security policy, and can be key 
players in solving disputes between different branches of government (e.g. 
Mitchell, 2005; Eichbaum & Shaw, 2014; Yong & Hazell, 2014; Gherghina & 
Kopecký, 2016; Marland, Lewis, & Flanagan, 2017).
Regular coordination and exchange of information between the staffs of 
the prime minister and the president should facilitate successful cooperation 
between the two executives. However, the size and responsibilities of 
the president’s staff can also be important variables. The budget of the 
president’s office is normally determined by the annual national budget, 
and in semi-presidential countries, the total number of staff working for 
the president tends to be quite small. Presidents can compensate this with 
recruiting personnel that focus on specific policy areas, including those 
falling in the competence of the government. For example, a policy adviser 
in economy can provide crucial information to the president and can 
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form contacts with the relevant ministry and parliamentary committee. 
Furthermore, small but effective communication staff can be of substantial 
help in spreading the word about president’s views and activities.
As theorised above, the existence of such coordination mechanisms 
should correlate with the level of presidential activism – both through 
public speeches (“going public”) or direct contacts with political parties, 
the legislature, or civil society stakeholders. That is, the less the president 
meets the PM or the government, the more there is space and need for 
direct contacts with other members of the cabinet, the parliament and its 
party groups, or the leaders of political parties, with the president building 
these contacts to “stay in the loop” of governmental activities and to 
influence decision-making in the cabinet or the legislature. This should 
also increase the probability of the president seeking to influence policy 
areas falling under the jurisdiction of the government, including through 
direct appeals to the public.
Case Selection and Data
The three cases represent both variation and similarities. As explained 
in the introductory section, they represent different semi-presidential 
experiences: a stable political system and the considerable weakening 
of a historically strong presidency in Finland from the 1990s onwards; 
general intra-executive stability under a personalised political system in 
Lithuania; and strong presidential influence, personalised politics, and high 
institutional tensions in Romania.1 The constitutional prerogatives of the 
president are stronger in Lithuania and Romania than in Finland, but in all 
three countries in foreign and security policy as well as in EU affairs the 
powers of the respective presidents are broadly similar, with foreign policy 
leadership shared between the president and the government. Lithuania 
1  Typically such conflicts have revolved around government formation, appointments, and 
clashes over government performance. For a closer inspection of intra-executive conflicts in 
the three countries, see Gallagher and Andrievici (2008), Krupavičius (2008; 2013); Raunio 
(2012), Gherghina (2013), and Elgie (2018).
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and Romania also have the shared legacy of systemic communism, the 
subsequent transition to democracy and market economy in the 1990s, 
and the EU and NATO accession processes in the 2000s. Overall, intra-
executive relations in Finland have been essentially harmonious whereas 
Lithuania and particularly Romania have witnessed serious conflicts 
between the PM and the president. 
The analysis covers the period from the early 1990s to 2017. Data consists 
of official documents, secondary material such as politicians’ memoirs 
and research literature, and particularly interview data with top-level civil 
servants and politicians with first-hand knowledge on president-cabinet 
relations. Having charted the existence of coordination mechanisms, the key 
objective of the interviews was to establish the actual role and importance 
of these institutions. The topic is obviously quite sensitive and the 
interviewees were willing to speak only under the condition of anonymity. 
A total of 10 persons were interviewed in Finland, 9 in Lithuania, and 11 in 
Romania. Many of them had experience of intra-executive coordination 
under two or more presidents. The positions of the interviewees include 
current and former high-level civil servants, counsellors and advisors in the 
offices of the president and the PM, speakers and members of parliaments, 
and ministers including one former prime minister.2
Coordination Between the President 
and the Government
The comparison of coordination mechanisms reveals significant differences 
between the three countries (Table 1). Turning first to bilateral, confidential 
exchanges between the two leaders, in Finland the system has remained 
the same ever since the new constitution entered into force in 2000. The 
2  For reasons of space the official documents or the interviewed persons are not listed. The 
official documents mainly consisted of the respective constitutions and relevant laws, as well 
as governments’ rules of procedure and other documents about intra-executive coordination. 
The full list of research material is available from the author.
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president meets the PM essentially on a weekly basis, on Fridays before 
the plenary of the government and a potential meeting of the Ministerial 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. These bilateral meetings are 
very short, lasting normally at most half an hour. While not based any law 
or decree, the meetings have become an established practice not dependent 
on individual office-holders. In Lithuania and Romania, on the other hand, 
much depends on the party-political context and the presidents that have 
the initiative regarding such meetings. In Lithuania the presidents have by 
and large met prime ministers regularly, but presidents have also opted 
not to have such bilateral talks. For example, current President Dalia 
Grybauskaitė has met the PM almost weekly, but for six months in 2016 
there were no regular meetings with the PM. Also during the presidencies of 
Algirdas Brazauskas and Valdas Adamkus the regularity of meetings varied. 
In Romania there is no such institutionalised practice: instead, there are 
meetings or phone calls on various topics when the need arises, with such 
interaction smoother and more active when the president and the PM share 
the same political affiliation (for example Nicolae Văcăroiu and Ion Iliescu, 
Victor Ciorbea and Emil Constantinescu, and Emil Boc and Traian Băsescu).
In Finland the president meets also the foreign minister on a weekly basis, 
but not other ministers with the exception of those government plenaries 
chaired by the president. This is logical given that the president has no 
competence in domestic policy. In Lithuania each president and particularly 
their staff have in turn been in active contact with the cabinet ministers 
and their ministries. The size of the president’s office may be small, but, 
interestingly, the staff of each Lithuanian president has comprised mainly 
policy advisers in areas falling under the competence of the government 
– including social policy, economic policy, education, culture, religion etc. 
With the help of these advisors, successive presidents have actively formed 
ties with not just individual ministers and ministries but also with political 
parties, the speakers, party groups and individual deputies of Seimas and 
civil society stakeholders. Such behaviour is driven by policy-seeking logic, 
as the Lithuanian president can in the end achieve very little alone. Largely 
the same applies to Romania, where each president has utilised various 
channels to influence government decision-making, from ties to political 
parties and civil society stakeholders to addressing the legislature. The size 
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of the president’s office is considerably larger than in Finland or Lithuania, 
and the advisors to the president cover essentially all policy sectors, 
including economic policy. It appears that in Romania the links between 
the president and his political party remain much stronger during the 
presidency than in Finland or Lithuania (Gherghina, Iancu, & Soare, 2016). 
An interesting feature is presidential speeches in the parliament. They have 
become more numerous over time and can be considered as an agenda-
YES/NO LEGAL STATUS CHANGE OVER TIME/REMARKS
FIN LIT ROM FIN LIT ROM FIN LIT ROM
Bilateral meetings, 
president-PM Yes Yes
Yes, in relation 
to sensitive 
issues
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government







where president is 
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Varies depending on parliamentary 
majority and the party-political 
situation
TABLE 1. Intra-executive coordination mechanisms in Finland, Lithuania and Romania
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setting device, with the president presenting his vision about the most 
important societal questions. Such vision is more likely to be implemented 
if the president has a friendly majority in the legislature, whereas under 
cohabitation the president criticizes governmental decisions and tries to 
promote his own views on how Romania should be governed.3 
None of the countries employ more permanent joint councils that 
would bring together the president and members of the government. 
Finland is the only country utilising ministerial committees, with the 
president chairing the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy. Meeting regularly, the ministerial committee performs in important 
function in the co-leadership of foreign and security policy between the 
president and the cabinet. The Finnish ministerial committee can also in 
a sense be perceived as a national security council, although without the 
presence of representatives of armed forces. In Lithuania the functions and 
competence of the State Defence Council are defined in the constitution 
and the Special Law on State Defence Council, and presidents Brazauskas 
and Adamkus made use of some joint councils. In Romania the president 
can chair those sessions of the full government where national security 
issues are on the agenda, but presidents have used this prerogative to a 
varying extent. As in Lithuania, there is a specific Supreme Council of 
National Defence (CSAT) that brings together the president and the PM. 
Finally, in all countries there is active coordination between the offices 
of the president and the prime minister, although such communication 
between civil servants appears least institutionalised in Romania. 
The variation clearly correlates with both the level of presidential activism 
as well as with the intensity of intra-level conflict. It was hypothesised 
that absent of a working constitutional division of labour and established 
coordination, presidents are more likely to use alternative channels of 
influence – especially the strategy of “going public” or direct contacts 
with other political actors – and to intervene in questions falling under the 
3  The Romanian constitution (article 80.2.) stipulates that the president “mediates between 
the different branches of state power” as well as “between state and society.” On both cases 
of impeachment against President Băsescu in 2007 and 2012, it was argued that instead of 
“mediating” the president had too strongly influenced the work of the other state institutions. 
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competence of the government. Again the differences between the cases 
are significant. In Finland, the presidents have essentially never publicly 
criticised the government, not even during divided government. For 
example, when the social democratic President Tarja Halonen shared power 
with centre-right prime ministers from 2003 to 2012, she often emphasised 
different topics in her speeches, but even in case of open clashes, such as over 
appointments or representation in the European Council (see below), she 
refrained from publicly attacking the government. In 
Lithuania and Romania, on the other hand, presidents 
have not hesitated to “go public.” Lithuanian 
presidents have publicly questioned the legitimacy 
of governments, with President Adamkus even using 
two high-profile television speeches to force prime 
ministers Gediminas Vagnorius and Brazauskas 
to resign. In Romania, apart from addressing the 
legislature, presidents have directly attacked the 
prime ministers and criticised the governments and 
other state organs. In line with previous research 
on semi-presidentialism, such public criticism of 
the PM in Lithuania and Romania is considerably 
more pronounced during periods of cohabitation. 
Presidents are also more likely to resort to direct contacts with political 
parties, the state administration, and civil society actors when they do not 
have friendly majorities in the parliament. Moreover, in all three countries, 
although definitely least in Finland, presidents have in their speeches 
underlined their position as leaders of the countries, distancing themselves 
from party politics and the political class (see also Gallagher & Andrievici, 
2008; Krupavičius, 2008, 2013; Gherghina, 2013; Raunio & Sedelius, 2017).
Lack of rules in turn explains presidential “power grabs” in EU affairs. 
In all three countries the government and specifically the PM is in charge 
of national European policy, with the competence of the respective 
presidents basically restricted to foreign and security policy – and thereby 
at least indirectly to CFSP. Following Lisbon Treaty (2009) each country 
is represented in the European Council either by the prime minister or 
the president, and in Finland, despite objections from Halonen, who had 
In Finland, 
the presidents have 
essentially never 
publicly criticized 
the government, not 
even during divided 
government. 
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participated in the majority of the European Council meetings together 
with the PM, it was decided by the government that the PM would be 
representing Finland. According to a constitutional amendment from 
2012 “The Prime Minister represents Finland on the European Council. 
Unless the Government exceptionally decides otherwise, the Prime 
Minister also represents Finland in other activities of the European 
Union requiring the participation of the highest level of State” (for more 
discussion, see Raunio, 2012).
In Lithuania, the constitution, secondary laws, or the rules about 
domestic EU coordination do not detail who should represent the 
country in the European Council. President Adamkus participated in 
those European Councils which featured foreign and security policy while 
the PM covered other matters. Often both executives would attend the 
summits. Grybauskaitė in turn participates in the European Council, even 
though constitutional provisions about division of labor clearly suggest 
that the PM should represent Lithuania. Overall, her influence appears 
quite strong in EU and economic affairs, partly because Grybauskaité 
had served previously as the finance minister and as the Commissioner 
for Financial Programming and the Budget. According to one interview 
the prime ministers did not contest this arrangement: “The leader which 
enjoys public support can easily do such things ad hoc, therefore it was 
possible to establish certain practices without any legal documents – just 
like with attendance of the meetings of the European Council.” The lack of 
contestation was aided by the weakness of the government as PM Andrius 
Kubilius needed presidential support for the austerity measures (Raunio & 
Sedelius, 2017). In Romania it is also the president that attends the summits 
of the European Council, with the PM only travelling to the meetings upon 
delegation by the president. Following a major conflict between PM Victor 
Ponta and President Băsescu in 2012, the Constitutional Court confirmed 
that the president represents Romania in the European Council. 
Overall, ad hoc practices facilitate presidential influence. Lithuanian 
and Romanian presidents also have the power of initiative regarding 
cooperation, with forms and levels of intra-executive coordination 
essentially always determined by the president. For example, while joint 
councils or ministerial committees might facilitate better coordination, 
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presidents do not need such bodies. As one interviewee from Lithuania 
put it: “Presidents that have enough powers do not create such councils, 
they do not need such kind of institutions, they just arrange ad hoc meetings 
despite the fact that it is not foreseen in any law.” Coordination is clearly 
most institutionalised in foreign and security policy, including between 
foreign ministries and the president’s office. Lithuania and Romania 
utilise specific national security councils whereas Finland has a ministerial 
committee on security policy. Such bodies facilitate confidential exchange 
of information between the two executives, and the interviews in general 
confirm that even when the president and the PM disagree about domestic 
matters, particular attention is paid to ensuring that the countries speak 
with one voice in international negotiations.4
The results also provide evidence of considerable stability as initially 
adopted practices have become the standard or appropriate course of 
action. Reflecting its more stable and regulated political system, Finland 
stands out with its strongly institutionalised coordination mechanisms. 
In Lithuania and Romania, on the other hand, each new president brings 
her own staff, personality and leadership style to the equation. When 
both countries adopted semi-presidential constitutions, it was for various 
reasons not perceived important or legitimate to establish coordination 
mechanisms between the executives. And as the analysis suggests, 
presidents may well benefit from such absence of regular cooperation.
Discussion
This chapter has contributed to the literature on semi-presidentialism 
and political leadership through paying attention to coordination 
mechanisms between the president and the government. The results may 
not be altogether surprising but they are logical: the more institutionalised 
4  However, clashes over security policy can still occur. In 2006 the Romanian PM Tariceanu 
announced publicly that Romanian troops would withdraw from Afghanistan. President 
Băsescu disagreed and CSAT did not follow Tariceanu’s recommendation. As a result, the 
government had to comply with the decision of CSAT (Gherghina & Miscoiu, 2013).
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and regular cooperation between the two executives is, the less we find 
presidential activism and thereby also intra-executive conflict. The absence 
of coordination in turn produces more tensions and opens the door for 
presidential activism, not least through public criticism of the cabinet and 
direct contacts to political parties, the state administration, the legislature, 
and civil society actors.
At the same time one must exercise caution when drawing lessons 
from this study. It compared one stable democracy (Finland) with two 
younger, less institutionalised political regimes (Lithuania and Romania). 
Furthermore, one cannot exactly measure the importance of coordination 
mechanisms. For example, the transition to democracy and the broader 
modernisation of the society have proven difficult in Romania, with poor 
constitutional design contributing to the high level of intra-executive 
conflicts (Ghergina, 2015; Elgie, 2018). Yet, one can ask whether the 
presence of regular coordination mechanisms could have prevented the two 
impeachments of President Băsescu or the overall assertive presidential 
behaviour. Similarly one can reflect on how much the relatively smooth 
intra-executive relations in Finland result from the president meeting both 
the PM and the whole government almost every week.
The chapter also highlights the interplay between institutional 
mechanisms, political culture, and party politics. The semi-presidential 
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe are in general characterised by 
personality-centred political cultures coupled with low trust in parties and 
political institutions. This facilitates presidential activism irrespective of 
the party-political context and makes it possible for individual presidents 
to create non-constitutional institutions in their own favour. Both 
Lithuania and Romania have opted not to establish regular intra-executive 
coordination mechanisms, and this study suggests the need to explore 
whether the lack of coordination instruments and the observed behavioural 
patterns apply also to other countries in the region. Institutionalised 
coordination mechanisms may make politics more boring through reducing 
public confrontations between the two executives, but they also facilitate 
policy-making and coherent political leadership, outcomes that are clearly 
relevant for all semi-presidential countries.
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